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It’s not often that the U.S. Supreme Court overrules a 96-year-old
precedent. For that reason, the Court’s decision in Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,1 which quite properly overruled
the much-maligned 1911 Dr. Miles decision,2 must be deemed the
most noteworthy antitrust decision of October Term 2006.3 In the
long run, though, another antitrust decision from the term may turn
out to be more important. That decision is Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,4 in which the Court addressed the
legal standard applicable to predatory bidding claims (i.e., claims
that buyers of inputs have driven prices up higher than necessary in
an attempt to drive rival input-buyers from the market and thereby
enhance monopsony power).5
On first glance, the matter addressed by the Weyerhaeuser Court
looks quite narrow:Must a plaintiff complaining of predatory bidding
make the same two-part showing as a predatory pricing plaintiff?6
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
2Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
3For an account of why the Dr. Miles decision was wrong and Leegin is right, see
Thom Lambert, Dr. Miles (1911–2007), available at http://www.truthonthemarket.
com/2007/06/29/dr-miles-1911-2007.
4127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
5See id at 1075–76. Monopsony power is the flip-side of monopoly power; it is
‘‘market power on the buy side of the market.’’ Id. at 1075.
6 Id. at 1074. The Supreme Court laid down its two part test for predatory pricing
in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), in which
it held that a plaintiff complaining of predatory pricing must show (1) ‘‘that the
prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of [the defendant’s] costs,’’
Id. at 222, and (2) that ‘‘the [defendant] had . . . a dangerous probabilit[y] of recouping
its investment in below-cost prices’’ by charging supra-competitive prices once its
rivals were extinguished. Id. at 224.
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In answering that narrow question in the affirmative,7 however, the
Supreme Court may have unwittingly weighed in on one of the most
hotly disputed matters in antitrust—how to define ‘‘exclusionary
conduct’’ under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.8
This article advances two primary claims, one descriptive and one
normative. As a descriptive matter, it contends that Weyerhaeuser
implicitly adopts one proposed definition of exclusionary conduct
under Section 2 and implicitly rejects three others. As a normative
matter, it argues that this is a salutary development.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes the ongoing
debate over how to define exclusionary conduct under Section 2.
Part III then describes Weyerhaeuser and explains, as a descriptive
matter, why it constitutes an implicit endorsement of the ‘‘exclusion
of an equally efficient rival’’ definition of exclusionary conduct. Part
IV defends that endorsement.
II. Proposed Definitions of ‘‘Exclusionary Conduct’’ Under
Section 2
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the primary antitrust provision
governing unilateral conduct by dominant firms, prohibits (among
other offenses) ‘‘monopolization.’’9 The Supreme Court has defined
themonopolization offense to consist of two elements: (1) the posses-
sion of monopoly power in a relevant market, and (2) exclusionary
conduct designed to attain, protect, or expand such power.10 For
quite some time now, courts and commentators have struggled to
articulate a workable definition of exclusionary conduct.11 The diffi-
culty arises because all sorts of pro-competitive behavior is literally
7Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1078 (‘‘The general theoretical similarities of monopoly
and monopsony combined with the theoretical and practical similarities of predatory
pricing and predatory bidding convince us that our two-pronged Brooke Group test
should apply to predatory bidding claims.’’).
815 U.S.C. § 2.
9 Id. (‘‘Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony. . . .’’).
10United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (listing elements of
monopolization under Section 2 of Sherman Act).
11See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 147 (2005).
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exclusionary. For example, if Acme Inc. usurps business from its
rivals by lowering its price or building a better mousetrap, it has
literally excluded its rivals from somemarketing opportunities,mak-
ing it more difficult for them to stay in business. Yet it would be
perverse to forbid price-cuts and quality enhancements. The trick
for courts, then, has been to articulate some test for identifying
conduct that is unreasonably exclusionary.
The prevailing definition of unreasonably exclusionary conduct
in the case law comes from the Supreme Court’s Grinnell decision,
which defined exclusionary conduct as ‘‘the willful acquisition or
maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.’’12 But what is ‘‘willful’’ acquisition of
monopoly power? Practically every firm ‘‘wills’’ to beat out its rivals
and thereby attain monopoly power.13 Recognizing as much, courts
have sometimes referred to exclusionary conduct as conduct other
than ‘‘competition on the merits.’’14 But what exactly is that? These
verbal formulae are not very helpful. In the words of Professor Einer
Elhauge, the judicial definitions of exclusionary conduct are ‘‘not
just vague but vacuous.’’15
Accordingly, a generalized definition of exclusionary conduct has
become the Holy Grail for antitrust scholars. Last year, the American
Bar Association’sAntitrust Law Journal published a symposium issue
12Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71.
13Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (‘‘Unfortunately, theGrinnell test is not ofmuch assistance in resolving particular
cases. Every competitor seeks to capture as much business as possible. If Grinnell
condemns all such behavior by actual and threatenedmonopolists, it would condemn
the proverbial inventor of the better mousetrap as well as the storied trusts of the
nineteenth century.’’).
14See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (‘‘To
establish a section 2 violation, one must prove that the party charged had monopoly
power in a relevantmarket and acquired ormaintained that power by anti-competitive
practices instead of by competition on the merits.’’); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d
141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (‘‘Exclusionary conduct . . . not only, one, tends to
impair the opportunities of . . . rivals, but also, number two, either does not further
competition on the merits, or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.’’).
15Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253,
255 (2003).
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on the matter,16 and the topic emerged repeatedly during recent
joint Federal Trade Commission-Department of Justice hearings on
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Indeed, at the introductory session of
those hearings, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Deborah Platt
Majoras characterized the issue of how unilateral conduct should
be evaluated as having ‘‘dominated our antitrust debate for several
years’’ and as ‘‘the most heavily discussed and debated area of
competition policy in the international arena.’’17
At this point, four proposed definitions of exclusionary conduct
appear most promising.18 They are: (1) conduct that could exclude
from the defendant’s market an equally efficient rival, (2) conduct
that raises rivals’ costs unjustifiably, (3) conduct that enhances mar-
ket power and does not create enough consumer benefit to offset
that harm, and (4) conduct thatwould involve a sacrifice of profits (or
wouldmake ‘‘no economic sense’’) but for its ability to exclude rivals.
A. Excluding An Equally Efficient Rival
Judge Posner is responsible for popularizing the first definition. In
the second edition of his book,Antitrust Law, he defined exclusionary
conduct as that which is ‘‘likely in the circumstances to exclude from
the defendant’s market an equally or more efficient competitor.’’19
This definition comports with the typical understanding of vigorous
but fair competition. A competitive race is one in which (1) each
runner does his best and (2) the fastest runner wins. Any conduct
that could result in a winner other than the fastest runner is literally
anti-competitive. At the same time, conduct that helps a competitor
16Symposium: Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2, 73 Antitrust L.J.
311 (2006).
17Transcript of Hearing, Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice
Hearings on Section 2 of the ShermanAct: Single-FirmConduct as Related toCompeti-
tion (June 20, 2006) at 10 (available at http://ftc.gov./os/sectiontwohearings/docs/
60620FTC.pdf.).
18See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 148–62. A fifth approach rejects the
notion of a single generalized definition. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Defining Exclusionary
Conduct Under Section 2: The Case for Non-Universal Standards, in International
Antitrust LawandPolicy 433 (2006) (BarryHawk, ed.) (advocatingdifferent evaluative
approaches for different types of potentially exclusionary conduct);Mark S. Popofsky,
Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying
Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 Antitrust L. J. 435 (2006) (applying an over-
arching rule of reason to select distinct tests for different conduct).
19Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 194–95 (2000).
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along—but could not push him ahead of his more deserving rivals—
is expected. Under Posner’s definition, competitors would be moti-
vated to take all actions that would push them forward, except for
those actions that could push them ahead of superior or equally
competent and aggressive rivals. Each competitor would work his
hardest, free from fear that hewould be beaten by a less capable rival.
The definition has some support in the case law, most obviously
in the law governing predatory pricing.20 Under governing prece-
dents, a plaintiff complaining of predatory pricing must prove that
the defendant set its price below its cost.21 Because any equally (or
more) efficient rival could meet a discount that resulted in above-
cost pricing, this requirement has the effect of punishing only those
price cuts that could exclude equally efficient rivals. As explained
below, though, the equally efficient rival test has been criticized as
being under-deterrent.22
B. Raising Rivals’ Costs Unjustifiably
The second prominent exclusionary conduct definition is signifi-
cantly broader. That definition arises from so-called ‘‘post-Chicago’’
economic theories that purport to explain how dominant firms may
use contracts, product innovations, or other means to impose dispro-
portionately higher costs on their rivals.23 By imposing such costs,
dominant firms enable themselves to charge higher prices even if
they do not completely exclude their rivals. They may do so because
their competitors have become less efficient and thus less able to
check higher prices.24
20The definition has also achieved some traction in the case law governing bundled
discounts. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
21See supra note 6 (summarizing two-part predatory pricing test outlined in Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993)).
22See infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
23Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 159–60. For a lucid discussion of ‘‘post-Chicago’’
antitrust, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique,
2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 257.
24See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed
Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 Antitrust L.J. 311, 315 (2006) (‘‘[Raising Rivals’ Costs]
generally describes conduct to raise the costs of competitors with the purpose and
effect of causing them to raise their prices or reduce their output, thereby allowing
the excluding firm to profit by setting a supracompetitive price.’’).
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In light of these post-Chicago theories, a number of scholars advo-
cate a definition that deems conduct exclusionary if it raises rivals’
costs unjustifiably. The cost-raising must be ‘‘unjustifiable’’ because
much pro-competitive, efficient conduct raises rivals’ costs.25 For
example, offering a superior product or charging a lower price may
usurp business from rivals, thereby reducing their scale and increas-
ing their per-unit costs. Yet consumer-friendly design enhancements
and price reductions should not be deemed exclusionary. The
$64,000 question, then, is ‘ ‘When is cost-raising conduct
unjustifiable?’’
One option is to answer that question case-by-case, based on the
competitive effects of the conduct at issue.26 But that approach begs
the question of which competitive effects will render a cost-raising
practice unjustifiable. In light of that difficulty, Professor Elhauge,
a leading proponent of the ‘‘raising rivals’ costs’’ approach, has
proposed a more structured test that essentially defines ‘‘justifiable’’
increases of rivals’ costs as those that result as a byproduct of the
defendant’s enhanced efficiency. In other words, if the defendant’s
conduct raises rivals’ costs because it makes the defendant more
efficient, the cost-raising is justifiable; if the conduct raises rivals’
costs even without making the defendant more efficient, the cost-
raising is unjustifiable.27
25See, e.g., Posner, supra note 19, at 196 (contending that raising rivals’ costs is ‘‘not
a happy formula’’ and observing that a primary means of raising rivals’ costs is by
becoming so efficient as to make one’s rivals ‘‘unable to reach a level of output at
which to exploit the available economies of scale’’).
26See, e.g., Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive
Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67
Antitrust L.J. 615 (2000). The authors contend that loyalty discounts may raise rivals’
costs by denying them economies of scale. Id. at 627–30. The authors then conclude
that loyalty discounts should not be governed by straightforward predatory pricing
rules but should instead by judged on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 638 (‘‘Where the
pricing structure, rather than the price level, is used to secure an anticompetitive
result, the cost test of predatory pricing does not automatically apply. Instead, one
must conduct a case-by-case analysis of the actual effects of the particular practice
to determine whether anticompetitive outcomes are likely.’’).
27Elhauge, supra note 15, at 330. Professor Elhauge maintains that antitrust law
should eschew ‘‘an open-ended rule of reason balancing test’’ for determining when
cost-raising conduct is justifiable and should instead
employ[] two rules to sort out when to condemn conduct that helps acquire
or maintain monopoly power. One rule makes such conduct per se legal
if its exclusionary effect on rivals depends on enhancing the defendant’s
efficiency. The other rule makes such conduct per se illegal if its exclusionary
effect on rivals will enhancemonopoly power regardless of any improvement
in defendant efficiency.
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As explained below, even the more structured versions of the
raising rivals’ costs approach are likely to be exceedingly difficult
to administer and intolerably indeterminate.28
C. The Consumer Welfare Effect Test (A ‘‘Market-Wide Balancing’’
Approach)
A third set of tests for exclusionary conduct focuses on the chal-
lenged act’s net effect on consumer welfare.29 The most prominent
version of this sort of test appears in theAreeda-Hovenkamp treatise,
the leading antitrust treatise, which defines exclusionary conduct as
acts that:
(1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging
monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and
(2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are
unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that the acts
produce, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to the result-
ing benefits.30
Some commentators have referred to this sort of test as a ‘‘market-
wide balancing’’ approach, for all the ‘‘action,’’ from a practical
standpoint, occurs in part 2c.31 Challenges to conduct that failed to
meet the first element would be immediately dismissed, and parts
2a and 2b deal with easy cases involving harm without benefit.32
Because generalized definitions of exclusionary conduct are likely
to be invoked only when the conduct at issue involves a mixed bag
of pro-competitive benefits and anti-competitive harms, application
of the test will almost always come down to balancing harms and
benefits.
28See infra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.
29See, e.g., Salop, supra note 24, at 329–57 (arguing for a ‘‘consumer welfare effect
test’’); Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 148–51 (arguing for test that similarly focuses
on a practice’s net effects on consumers).
30Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 3 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Anti-
trust Principles and Their Application ¶ 651a at 72 (2d ed. 2002).
31See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclu-
sionary Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 Antitrust L.J. 375, 379 (2006).
32 Id. at 380 (explaining why the Areeda-Hovenkamp test requires market-wide
balancing in all cases in which a generalized test for exclusionary conduct would be
helpful—i.e., those cases that involve ‘‘conduct that creates both efficiency benefits
and exclusionary harm’’).
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So construed, the Areeda-Hovenkamp definition is troubling for
a couple of reasons. First, market-wide balancing of the various
effects of mixed bag conduct is extremely difficult and would likely
exceed the competence of courts and enforcement agencies. As
Douglas Melamed recently observed, balancing the benefits and
harms of efficiency-creating but exclusion-causing conduct would
require courts to (1) ‘‘quantify[] both welfare effects by estimating
price, cost, and quantity of output under two conditions—before
and after exclusion of rivals’’; (2) ‘‘deal[] with the time dimension
(both duration and discounting to present value) of each’’; and
(3) ‘‘compare[] both to a hypothetical but-for world in which the
conduct did not take place.’’33 Such an inquiry would be next to
impossible. In addition, a consumerwelfare effect testwould provide
businesses with little ex ante guidance regarding the legality of pro-
posed courses of conduct and is therefore likely to deter efficiency-
enhancing, but novel, practices.34
D. The ‘‘No Economic Sense’’ Test
Whereas the approaches discussed above attempt to define exclu-
sionary conduct—that is, to specify what it is about challenged
conduct that makes it unreasonably exclusionary—the final
approach seeks merely to identify such conduct. In other words, the
approach abandons the Platonic quest for the essence of ‘‘unreason-
able exclusionariness’’ and instead merely posits a test that will
33 Id. at 381; see also Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under
Section 2: The ‘‘No Economic Sense’’ Test, 73 Antitrust L.J. 413, 431 (2006) (‘‘Even if
economists could perfectly sort out the relatively short-run economic consequences
of all marketplace conduct, they still could not accurately account for the important
long-term effects of any remedial action on incentives for innovation and risk taking—
the twin engines of our prosperity.’’).
34As Douglas Melamed recently argued:
The balancing test would require a firm to determine, before it embraces
new competitive strategies, not just the impact of the strategies on its business,
but also the impact on rivals and to weigh the benefits to its consumers
against the long-run harm to consumers if the firm’s less-inventive rivals
are weakened or driven from the market as a result. Assessing the long-run
harm would require, among other things, calculating the duration of the
harm in light of responses by competitors, new entry, and future innovation.
Melamed, supra note 31, at 381. Given the near impossibility of this inquiry and the
high cost of making amistake (i.e., an adverse treble damages judgment), firmswould
likely forgo aggressive new methods of competition to the detriment of consumers.
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identify conduct that is unreasonably exclusionary without saying
what it is about the conduct that makes it so.
Early versions of this identifying (as opposed to defining)
approach focused on profit sacrifice: conduct was tagged as unrea-
sonably exclusionary if (but not because) it involved a sacrifice of
immediate profits as part of a strategy whose profitability depended
on the exclusion of rivals.35 A purported benefit of a sacrifice-based
approach is its administrability; proponents maintain that it can be
easily applied both by courts and regulators analyzing past conduct
and by firms and antitrust counselors analyzing proposed conduct.36
Despite this virtue, Professor Hovenkamp has criticized the tradi-
tional profit sacrifice test for being both over- and under-inclusive.37
It is over-inclusive, he argues, because it would condemn some
clearly pro-competitive conduct, such as new product develop-
ment.38 Hovenkamp offers the example of a firm that invests heavily
in designing a new mousetrap that, when marketed, will drive out
the competition. Such innovation, which would appear to involve
an immediate profit sacrifice that leads to monopoly, obviously
should not be condemned under the antitrust laws.39 On the other
hand, Hovenkamp maintains, the test is under-inclusive because it
would fail to condemn various acts of monopoly maintenance (such
as certain tying and exclusive contracts) that ‘‘may be profitable the
instant they are in place yet also anticompetitive.’’40
35See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 Yale L.J. 8 (1981); Robert H. Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself 144 (1978).
36See, e.g., Melamed, supra note 31, at 393 (‘‘Perhaps most important, the sacrifice
test provides simple, effective, and meaningful guidance to firms so that they will
know how to avoid antitrust liability without steering clear of procompetitive con-
duct.’’); Werden, supra note 33, at 415 (‘‘Application of the no economic sense [variant
of the profit sacrifice] test is conceptually straightforward.’’).
37 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution
152–54 (2005); Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 155–58.
38Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 158 (‘‘All innovation is costly, and many successful
innovations succeed only because consumers substitute away from rivals’ older ver-
sions and toward the innovator’s version. . . . As a result, willingness to ‘sacrifice’
short-term profits in anticipation of later monopoly profits does not distinguish
anticompetitive from procompetitive uses of innovation.’’).
39Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 152.
40 Id. As an example of immediately profitable exclusionary devices, Hovenkamp
points to ‘‘tying and exclusive dealing contracts, such as Microsoft’s insistence that
Windows users also take Internet Explorer.’’ Id.
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Perhaps seeking to avoid these sorts of criticisms, some propo-
nents of a sacrifice-based test for identifying exclusionary conduct
have refined the test a bit.41 The version of the test advocated by the
U.S. Department of Justice, for example, provides that ‘‘conduct is
not exclusionary or predatory unless it would make no economic
sense for the defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen
competition.’’42 So construed, the test avoids Hovenkamp’s concerns
about its over- and under-inclusivity. The argument that the test is
‘‘too broad’’ because it would condemn investments in innovation
assumes that it is sufficient to ask whether the defendant’s conduct
entails a short run profit sacrifice. The ‘‘no economic sense’’ test,
though, would require more: upon finding a short-run sacrifice, one
must ask why it would be rational to make that sacrifice.43 If there’s
a profit-enhancing rationale (some ‘‘economic sense’’) besides a less-
ening of competition, then the test is not satisfied.44
Hovenkamp’s argument that the test is ‘‘too narrow’’ because it
would fail to condemn immediately profitable anticompetitive acts
similarly dissolves if the test is ‘‘no economic sense.’’ Whereas the
profit sacrifice test seemed to require two time periods—a short run
period in which there are losses followed by a later period in which
there is monopoly recoupment—the ‘‘no economic sense’’ test
focuses on the nature of the conduct and asks merely whether it
would reduce profits but for its tendency to eliminate competition.
The key question is not when the conduct will be profitable but why
it is (or is expected to be) profitable.45 So construed, the test condemns
41See generally Melamed, supra note 31; Werden, supra note 33.
42See, e.g., Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 15, Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398 (2004) (No. 02-682), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/05/trinkof.pdf
(emphasis omitted).
43See Werden, supra note 33, at 424 (‘‘When the defendant’s conduct entails a short-
run profit sacrifice, the no economic sense test further asks why it is rational to make
that sacrifice.’’).
44Hovenkamp’s mousetrap example, see supra note 39 and accompanying text,
would therefore fail. While ‘‘invest[ing] heavily in designing a better mousetrap’’
may entail a short run profit sacrifice, the rationality of that sacrifice does not depend
on the elimination of rivals; the sacrifice would be economically rational if it were
expected to result in a superior mousetrap for which consumers would be willing
to pay a higher price.
45See Melamed, supra note 31, at 391 (observing that it is ‘‘incorrect’’ to interpret
the profit-sacrifice test as holding that ‘‘conduct is anticompetitive only if it entails
losses in the short run followed by monopoly recoupment in some later period’’;
rather, ‘‘the test depends, not on the timeline, but rather on the nature of the conduct—
on whether it would make no business or economic sense but for its likelihood of
harming competition’’).
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practices that, inHovenkamp’swords, ‘‘may be profitable the instant
they are in place, yet also anticompetitive.’’46
III. The Weyerhaeuser Decision and Its Implications for the
Definitional Debate
When one considers the Weyerhaeuser decision in light of this
ongoing debate over how to define exclusionary conduct, the deci-
sion’s importance becomes apparent. The Supreme Court, it seems,
has weighed in on the definitional question.
A. The Weyerhaeuser Decision47
The plaintiff in Weyerhaeuser, Ross-Simmons, operated a hard-
wood lumber sawmill in Longview,Washington. It purchasedmany
of the red alder sawlogs it processed on the open bidding market,
competing for such purchases with Weyerhaeuser, the defendant.
Weyerhaeuser eventually grew to be substantially larger than Ross-
Simmons and by 2001 was acquiring about 65% of the alder logs
available for sale in the region.48
Ross-Simmons accused Weyerhaeuser of ‘‘predatory bidding.’’
Specifically, claimed Ross-Simmons, Weyerhaeuser bought more
alder sawlogs than it needed and bid up the price for alder sawlogs
higher than necessary to attain the quantity it required.49 This had
the effect of raising the cost of Ross-Simmons’ key input. At the
same time, Weyerhaeuser did not increase the price of its output;
market prices for finished hardwood lumber actually fell.50 This
created a revenue squeeze: the sawmills’ revenues (reflecting market
prices of finished hardwood) fell, even as the sawmills’ costs (reflect-
ing the unnecessarily high price of the most important input) were
rising. After enduring this squeeze for several years, Ross-Simmons
shut down its mill completely in 2001.51 Blaming Weyerhaeuser for
46Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 152.
47Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-SimmonsHardwoodLumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
48 Id. at 1072.
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its failure, Ross-Simmons sued the company for monopolization and
attempted monopolization under Sherman Act Section 2.52
Weyerhaeuser unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, and
then, after trial, sought judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively,
a new trial.53 The district court denied both requests.54 It also rejected
Weyerhaeuser’s proposed ‘‘predatory bidding’’ jury instruction,
which incorporated the predatory pricing elements set forth in the
Supreme Court’s Brooke Group decision.55 That decision held that a
plaintiff complaining of predatory pricing must establish that
(1) ‘‘the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of
its rival’s costs,’’56 and (2) ‘‘a dangerous probability’’ existed that the
rival would later ‘‘recoup[] its investment in below-cost prices’’ once
it stopped such pricing.57 Weyerhaeuser argued that the jury should
be instructed that overbidding for sawlogs could be anticompetitive
conduct only if it resulted in Weyerhaeuser’s operating at a loss and
a dangerous probability of its recoupment of losses existed.58 The
district court rejected Weyerhaeuser’s proposed instruction and
instead told the jury it could find an anticompetitive act if it con-
cluded that Weyerhaeuser ‘‘purchased more logs than it needed or
paid a higher price for logs than necessary, in order to prevent [Ross-
Simmons] from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair price.’’59
5215 U.S.C. § 2. Specifically, Ross-Simmonsmaintained thatWeyerhaeuser had used
‘‘its dominant position in the alder sawlog market to drive up the prices for alder
sawlogs to levels that severely reduced or eliminated the profit margins of Weyer-
haeuser’s alder sawmill competition.’’ Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1073.
53Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1073.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56BrookeGroup Ltd. v. Brown&Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509U.S. 209, 222 (1993).
57 Id. at 224.
58Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1073.
59 Id. The district court gave the following instruction regarding anticompetitive
conduct:
Anti-competitive conduct is conduct that has the effect of wrongly preventing
or excluding competition, or frustrating or impairing the efforts of other
firms to compete for customers within the relevant market, making it very
difficult or impossible for competitors to engage in fair competition. Not
everything that enables a company to gain or maintain a monopoly is
anti-competitive.
In deciding whether conduct is anti-competitive, you should consider
whether the conduct lacks a valid business purpose, or unreasonably or
unnecessarily impedes the efforts of other firms to compete for rawmaterials
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Concluding that Ross-Simmons had proven monopolization, the
jury returned a $26 million verdict, which was trebled to approxi-
mately $79 million.60
Weyerhaeuser appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, arguing that Brooke Group’s requirements for predatory pric-
ing should similarly apply to predatory bidding claims.61 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed.62 It reasoned that predatory bidding, while con-
ceptually similar to predatory pricing, does not necessarily produce
the same consumer benefit—lower prices for at least the short-term.63
The court concluded that ‘‘the concerns that led the Brooke Group
Court to establish a high standard of liability in the predatory pricing
context do not carry over to this predatory bidding context with the
same force,’’ so the Brooke Group standards for predatory pricing
liability should not apply to claims of predatory bidding.64
In an 8-0 decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Brooke Group’s standard of
liability does apply to predatory bidding claims.65 The Court’s hold-
ing was based on the similarity between predatory pricing and
predatory bidding.66 Both practices involve an attempt to attain mar-
ket power—i.e., the power to enhance one’s profits by affecting
or customers, or if the anticipated benefits of the conduct flow primarily
from its tendency to hinder or eliminate competition. Anti-competitive con-
duct does not include ordinary means of competition, such as offering better
products or services, exercising superior skill or business judgment, utilizing
more efficient technology, bettermarketing, or exercising natural competitive
advantages such as unique geographic access to raw materials or markets.
....
One of Plaintiffs’ contentions in this case is that the Defendant purchased
more logs than it needed or paid a higher price for logs than necessary, in
order to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair
price. If you find this to be true, you may regard it as an anti-competitive act.
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030,
1039 n.30 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated by Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
60Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1073.
61 Id.
62Weyerhaeuser, 411 F.3d at 1035–36.
63 Id. at 1037.
64 Id. at 1038.
65Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1074.
66 Id. at 1078.
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prices.67 Whereas predatory pricing may permit a firm to attain
monopoly power (the power to drive output prices upward by with-
holding one’s production), predatory bidding may enable a firm to
attainmonopsony power—the power to drive input prices (and thus
the firm’s costs) downward by cutting back on one’s purchases.68
Exercises of both types of market power result in allocative ineffi-
ciency—the wealth loss that occurs when resources, because of price
distortions, are not directed toward their highest and best uses.69
Thus, the Court concluded, ‘‘[p]redatory-pricing and predatory-bid-
ding are analytically similar.’’70
Moreover, claims of predatory-pricing and predatory-bidding
involve ‘‘strikingly similar allegations.’’71 A predatory-pricing plain-
tiff alleges that the defendant reduced the price of its product in
order to drive competing sellers out of business so that the defendant,
insulated from selling competition, could then raise its prices above
competitive levels. A predatory-bidding plaintiff alleges that the
defendant deliberately bid up the price of a key input in order
to drive competing buyers out of business so that the defendant,
insulated from buying competition, could then cut back on its input
purchases and thereby drive down the price of inputs. Both strategies
‘‘logically require firms to incur short-term losses on the chance that
they might reap supracompetitive profits in the future.’’72
Finally, the Court observed, ‘‘predatory biddingmirrors predatory
pricing in respects that [theCourt] deemed significant to [its] analysis
in Brooke Group.’’73 First, because both schemes require certain losses
and provide only speculative chances of future supracompetitive
profits, each is ‘‘rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.’’74 In
addition, the specific activities taken in connection with the two
schemes—output-discounting and input-stockpiling—may each
67 Id. at 1075.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1076.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1077.
74 Id. (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 226 (1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 589 (1986))).
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have pro-competitive effects.75 Discounting benefits consumers and
wins business for the discounter, and stockpiling inputsmay provide
‘‘a hedge against the risk of future rises in input costs or future
input shortages.’’76 Finally, both practices may benefit consumers in
the long-term: predatory pricing may do so if recoupment attempts
fail because of entry, and predatory bidding may do so if ‘‘the
acquisition of more inputs leads to the manufacture of more
outputs.’’77
Thus, the Court concluded, the similarities of predatory-pricing
and predatory-bidding warrant an identical liability standard—the
Brooke Group standard—for both types of conduct.78 Applied in the
predatory bidding context, the first prong of that standard requires
a plaintiff to prove that ‘‘the predator’s bidding on the buy side . . .
caused the cost of the relevant output to rise above the revenues
generated in the sale of those outputs.’’79 To satisfy the second prong,
the plaintiff must establish ‘‘that the defendant has a dangerous
probability of recouping the losses incurred in bidding up input
prices through the exercise of monopsony power.’’80 Because Ross-
Simmons had conceded that it could not satisfy these standards, its
monopolization claim failed.81
B. Implications of Weyerhaeuser for a Generalized Definition of
Exclusionary Conduct
On first glance, Weyerhaeuser would seem to be of little practical
significance. As the Supreme Court noted, the specific practice to
which the decision speaks is rarely attempted.82 The apparent nar-
rowness of theWeyerhaeuser decision, though, is likely deceiving. In
75Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1077 (‘‘Just as sellers use output prices to compete
for purchasers, buyers use bid prices to compete for scarce inputs. There are myriad
legitimate reasons—ranging from benign to affirmatively procompetitive—why a
buyer might bid up input prices.’’).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1078.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. (‘‘Ross-Simmons has conceded that it has not satisfied the Brooke Group
standard.’’).
82 Id. at 1077.
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its reasoning, if not its precise holding, the Weyerhaeuser Court took
sides in what is perhaps the greatest debate in contemporary anti-
trust—how to define exclusionary conduct. By holding that Ross-
Simmons’ evidence could not, as amatter of law, establish exclusion-
ary conduct, the Court implicitly rejected the sacrifice-based, con-
sumer welfare effect, and raising rivals’ costs tests for exclusionary
conduct and implicitly endorsed Judge Posner’s equally efficient
rival test. That’s because the first three tests, but not the last, would
have deemed Weyerhaeuser’s conduct exclusionary.
1. Sacrifice-Based Tests
First consider how Weyerhaeuser would have fared under the
profit sacrifice test and its ‘‘no economic sense’’ variant. Under that
test, the relevant question would have been whether there was suffi-
cient evidence to uphold a conclusion that Weyerhaeuser’s conduct
would have beenunprofitable—i.e., would havemade ‘‘no economic
sense’’—but for an enhancement in Weyerhaeuser’s market power.
Thus, the jurywould have been required to compareWeyerhaeuser’s
pre-overbidding profits with what its profits would have been had
it engaged in overbidding without experiencing an enhancement of
monopsony power; if the former figure were found to exceed the
latter, the conduct would have been exclusionary.83
Without doubt, the record supported a conclusion that Weyer-
haeuser’s conduct would not have been profit-enhancing but for the
fact that it enhanced the firm’s monopsony power. As the Ninth
Circuit emphasized,
83Professor Salop explains how the sacrifice-based tests operate as follows:
The profit-sacrifice test examines the profitability of the defendant’s conduct
relative to a hypotheticalmarket outcome that is used as the non-exclusionary
benchmark. The hypothetical ‘‘but for’’ marketplace is one in which it is
impossible to raise prices following the exclusionary conduct. When exclu-
sionary conduct potentially raises barriers to competition in some way, a
defendant’s exclusionary conduct can be said to sacrifice profits if the conduct
would have been unprofitable (and, thus, likely not undertaken) in the
absence of those enhanced barriers to competition.
Salop, supra note 24, at 319. Professor Salop notes that the traditional profit sacrifice
test and its no economic sense variant both involve this inquiry. Theprimarydifference
between the two is that the latter ‘‘does not require a showing that there is a period of
time inwhich the defendant’s profits are lower than theywere before the exclusionary
conduct was undertaken’’; thus, ‘‘[t]he reduction in profits can be conceptual rather
than temporal.’’ Id. at 319–20.
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One of Weyerhaeuser’s former senior analysts, Eugene
Novak . . . authored a memorandum regarding the costs of
sawlogs and lumber in which he stated that the increase in
sawlog prices despite Weyerhaeuser’s predominant market
share made no sense. Novak estimated that, due to the exces-
sive prices Weyerhaeuser paid for sawlogs, it ‘‘had given up
some $40 to $60 million dollars in the last three years.’’ He
testified that his boss, Vicki McInnally, who was a member
of the senior management team, told him that ‘‘that was the
strategy that [Weyerhaeuser] designed.’’84
Given such evidence, a reasonable jury certainly could have con-
cluded thatWeyerhaeuser’s conduct was exclusionary under a profit
sacrifice or no economic sense tests.
This point was emphasized to the Supreme Court. For example,
the American Antitrust Institute’s amicus brief in support of Ross-
Simmons observed that
[Weyerhaeuser’s] purchase of ‘‘more logs than it needed’’
and paying ‘‘a higher price for logs than necessary’’ are, as
the jury found, practices that satisfy both the sacrifice test
and the no economic sense test. Indeed, how could buying
more than necessary ever be sensible, efficient or otherwise
legitimate profit-maximizing conduct? Again, as the court of
appeals recognized, evidence from petitioner’s own officials
and documents precluded any finding of a valid business
purpose for this overbuying and overpaying.85
This no doubt overstates things a bit. As an amicus brief by a group
of economists emphasized, ‘‘overbidding’’ of the sort Weyerhaeuser
engaged in could be a profit-enhancing move.86 But under the
Supreme Court’s ruling, Ross-Simmons’ claim would have failed
even ifRoss-Simmons hadproven thatWeyerhaeuser’s conduct could
84Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030,
1042 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded by Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (alteration in orig.).
85Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dent at 8, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 1069 (2007) (No. 05-381), available at 2006 WL 2950593.
86See Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9–11, Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007)
(No. 05-381), available at 2006 WL 2459522.
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not have been calculated to enhance the company’s profits. Even if
there were no possible way the overbidding could have benefited
Weyerhaeuser but for its ability to exclude rivals, the overbidding
would not have been exclusionary unless it resulted in below-cost
pricing in the output market.87
2. The Consumer Welfare Effect Test
The consumer welfare effect test similarly would have resulted
in a decision for Ross-Simmons. Under the Areeda-Hovenkamp ver-
sion of that test, a factfinder first determines whether a challenged
practice is ‘‘reasonably capable of creating, enlarging, or prolonging
monopoly [or monopsony] power by impairing the opportunities
of rivals.’’88 Without doubt, the sort of overbidding with whichWey-
erhaeuser was charged was ‘‘reasonably capable’’ of enhancing the
firm’s monopsony power by impairing its competitors in the input
market.89 The second step of the Areeda-Hovenkamp test, then, is
designed to ensure that this enhancement of market power is not
offset by some benefit to consumers: the plaintiff must show that
the challenged practice either ‘‘do[es] not benefit consumers at all,’’
or is ‘‘unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that the act[]
produce[s],’’ or ‘‘produce[s] harms disproportionate to the resulting
benefits.’’90 There was almost certainly evidence in the record to
support a jury conclusion that one of these three prongs (most likely,
the second or third) was satisfied. While overbidding may provide
87Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1078 (‘‘A plaintiff must prove that the alleged preda-
tory overbidding led to below-cost pricing of the predator’s outputs.’’).
883 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 30, ¶ 651a, at 72.
89The Supreme Court conceded as much:
A predatory bidder ultimately aims to exercise the monopsony power gained
from bidding up input prices. To that end, once the predatory bidder has
caused competing buyers to exit the market for purchasing inputs, it will
seek to ‘‘restrict its input purchases below the competitive level,’’ thus ‘‘reduc-
[ing] the unit price for the remaining inputs it purchases.’’ . . . The reduction
in input prices will lead to ‘‘a significant cost saving that more than offsets
the profit[s] that would have been earned on the output.’’ If all goes as
planned, the predatory bidder will reap monopsonistic profits that will offset
any losses suffered in bidding up input prices.
Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1075–76 (quoting Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Over-
buying by Power Buyers, 72 Antitrust L. J. 669, 672 (2005)).
903 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 30, ¶ 651a, at 72.
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benefits for consumers, a point emphasized in the economists’ brief,91
the jury apparently concluded that any such benefits were minor
and incidental. Indeed, it was instructed that it should consider
whether the conduct had ‘‘a valid business purpose,’’ that ‘‘offering
better products or services’’ could not be anti-competitive, and that
the overbidding could be anti-competitive if it was done ‘‘in order
to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining the logs they needed at a
fair price.’’92 It seems, then, that the jury determined that the harms
from Weyerhaeuser’s monopsony-enhancing conduct were dispro-
portionate to the resulting consumer benefits.93
In any event, there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court’s
ruling rejects the consumer welfare effect test. Under the test laid
down by the Court, even if Ross-Simmons had shown that Weyer-
haeuser’s overbidding drove rivals out of business, was not calcu-
lated to benefit consumers in any way whatsoever, and in fact did
not produce an iota of consumer benefit, Ross-Simmons still would
have lost unless it had also shown that the input overbidding
resulted in a below-cost price for Weyerhaeuser’s finished product.94
3. Raising Rivals’ Costs Unjustifiably
If the Supreme Court believed exclusionary conduct is that which
unjustifiably raises rivals’ costs, then it surely would have sustained
91See Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae, supra note 86, at 9–11.
92See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d
1030, 1039 n.30 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting jury instruction), (vacated by Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007)).
93Again, the American Antitrust Institute emphasized this point to the Weyer-
haeuser Court:
[T]he jury was required to rule out such theoretical procompetitive explana-
tions for petitioner’s conduct before it could find against petitioner. More
specifically, the jury was instructed to determine (a) whether petitioner pur-
chasedmore logs than necessary ‘‘in order to prevent’’ plaintiffs frommeeting
their input needs; and (b) whether petitioner’s conduct ‘‘lacks a valid business
purpose.’’ . . . Given these instructions, the jury plainly rejected petitioner’s
contention that it bid up prices or increased its purchases for procompeti-
tive reasons.
Brief of American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae, supra note 85, at 3 (emphasis
in orig.).
94Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1078 (to create liability, ‘‘the predator’s bidding on
the buy side must have caused the cost of the relevant output to rise above the
revenues generated in the sale of those outputs.’’).
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the jury verdict in favor of Ross-Simmons. Weyerhaeuser’s overbid-
ding obviously drove up the price of an input its rivals used and
thereby raised their costs.95 The key question is whether that cost-
raising was justifiable. If justifiability were determined on a case-by-
case basis,96 the jury verdict would seem unassailable—the Supreme
Court would not question a jury’s decision on an ‘‘all things consid-
ered’’ matter. Affirmation would also have been required under
the more structured approach proposed by Professor Elhauge.97 He
would define exclusionary conduct as that which ‘‘would further
monopoly [here, monopsony] power by impairing the efficiency of
rivals even if the defendant did not successfully enhance its own effi-
ciency.’’98 In other words, if the impairment of rivals’ efficiency is
not an inevitable byproduct of the perpetrator’s improvement of its
own efficiency, then the cost-raising is unjustified.99 Here, Ross-
Simmons’ costs would have been raised by Weyerhaeuser’s over-
bidding even if that over-bidding did not enhance Weyerhaeuser’s
efficiency. Thus, the cost-raising would have been unjustified, and
the over-bidding would have been exclusionary.100
Regardless ofwhether the jury actually found thatWeyerhaeuser’s
raising of rivals’ costs was unjustified, it is clear that even an express
and fully supported jury finding that Weyerhaeuser had no pro-
competitive justification for its rival-impairing conduct would not
have helped Ross-Simmons. The Court essentially said that even if
the jury found that Weyerhaeuser had raised its rivals costs for no
good reason whatsoever, Ross-Simmons still would have lost unless
95 Id. at 1073 (citing record evidence showing that Weyerhaeuser’s bidding activity
had raised rivals’ costs).
96See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing approach that would deter-
mine justifiability of raising rivals’ costs on a case-by-case basis).
97See supra notes 27 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Elhauge’s test
for determining when raising rivals’ costs is justifiable).
98Elhauge, supra note 15, at 256 (emphasis supplied).
99 Id. (arguing that the only tolerable conduct that raises rivals’ costs is that which
‘‘successfully impair[s] rival efficiency only as a byproduct of thedefendant improving
its own efficiency’’).
100The jury was instructed that it could find an anti-competitive act if it concluded
that Weyerhaeuser engaged in overbidding ‘‘in order to’’ hurt Ross-Simmons by
raising its input costs. See supra notes 59. The jury thus appeared to find that the
cost-raising was not an incidental result of otherwise efficiency-enhancing conduct;
it was the intended result of the conduct. See supra note 93. Surely that could not be
a ‘‘justifiable’’ instance of raising rivals’ costs.
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it could have shown thatWeyerhaeuser’s conduct resulted in below-
cost prices for its finished product.101
4. Modus tollendo tollens102
A straightforward modus tollens argument therefore demonstrates
the Court’s rejection of the sacrifice-based, consumer welfare effect,
and raising rivals’ costs tests for exclusionary conduct:103
● If the essence of ‘‘exclusionariness’’ is either (1) failure to
enhance profits but for an enhancement of market power, or
(2) a reduction in consumer welfare occasioned by enhanced
market power, or (3) raising rivals’ costs unjustifiably, then
Weyerhaeuser’s conduct was unreasonably exclusionary.
● Weyerhaeuser’s conduct was not unreasonably exclusionary.
● Therefore, neither the sacrifice-based tests, nor the consumer
welfare effect standard, nor the raising rivals’ costs approach
determines whether conduct is unreasonably exclusionary for
purposes of Section 2.
5. Equally Efficient Rival
Weyerhaeuser is fully consistent, though, with a test that determines
whether conduct is exclusionary for purposes of Section 2 by asking
whether the conduct could exclude an equally efficient rival. If a
defendant who pays more for an input than the amount necessary
to obtain it still charges an above-cost price for whatever output he
sells, then any equally efficient seller of the same output could afford
to pay the same price for the input. Such a seller would not be driven
out of business by the overbidding. By contrast, if a defendant’s
overbidding results in a below-cost price for his product, then an
equally efficient rival could not meet the discount without similarly
pricing below cost and might thus be driven out of business by the
overbidding. If the defendant’s overbidding results in an output
price equal to its cost of producing the output, then all equally or
more efficient rivals could afford to pay the input price (and would
101Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1078 (holding that there can be no antitrust liability
based on predatory overbidding absent proof that the defendant’s overbidding
resulted in a below-cost price for its finished products).
102 ‘‘Mode that denies by denying.’’
103A modus tollens argument follows the following form: If P, then Q; not Q;
therefore, not P.
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thus stay in business) and all less efficient rivals could not afford
to do so (and would be excluded). Because Weyerhaeuser’s line of
illegality appears at precisely the point at which the conduct at issue
could exclude an equally efficient rival, the decision is consistent
with Judge Posner’s proposed test for exclusionary conduct.
IV. Should Exclusion of an Equally Efficient Rival Be Required
for Section 2 Liability?
So far, this article’s analysis has been entirely descriptive—I have
shown simply that Weyerhaeuser’s reasoning implicitly rejects the
sacrifice-based, consumer welfare balancing, and raising rivals’ costs
tests for exclusionary conduct under Sherman Act Section 2 and
implicitly endorses Judge Posner’s equally efficient rival approach.
I turn now to the normative question of whether this development
is a good one.
On the whole, it is. While a rule requiring proof that a practice
could exclude an equally efficient rival is somewhat underdeter-
rent,104 it is also much easier to apply in the context of litigation and
far less likely to result in false positives.105 Such a rule is therefore
less likely to deter ‘‘mixed bag’’ conduct that is, on balance, pro-
competitive.106 The key question, then, is whether the losses from
the rule’s relative under-deterrence are outweighed by the benefits
the rule offers in terms of lower administrative costs and reduced
losses from the over-deterrence of pro-competitive conduct. While
a detailed accounting of those various costs and benefits is beyond
the scope of this Article, there are sound reasons for believing that
the losses from the rule’s under-deterrence will be outweighed by
gains from lower administrative costs and reduced over-
deterrence.107
104See infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
105See infra notes 116–29 and accompanying text.
106 ‘‘Mixed bag’’ conduct refers to practices that may create some market power
(and may thus pose anticompetitive risks) but may also create efficiencies (and may
thus confer procompetitive benefits). Evaluating mixed bag, single-firm conduct is,
of course, the purpose of a generalized test for exclusionary conduct under Sherman
Act Section 2.
107See infra notes 129–50 and accompanying text.
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A. The Equally Efficient Rival Approach’s Under-Deterrence
The equally efficient rival rule is almost certainly somewhat under-
deterrent.108 Critics of the rule point to three sources of under-deter-
rence. While one of those sources is probably illusory, the other two
seem genuine.
First, critics of the rule maintain that it under-deters because it
would approve exclusion-causing conduct of no social utility as
long as that conduct could not exclude an equally efficient rival.109
Professor Hovenkamp, for example, offers the example of a fraudu-
lent patent suit that could be successfully defended by a rival with
equivalent efficiencies (and thus equivalent per unit profits) but not
by a less efficient upstart. Because the filing of such a lawsuit would
create no social value and could exclude some competition, the law
should sanction such behavior regardless ofwhether it could exclude
an equally efficient rival.110
While that point seems correct, it does not discredit the equally
efficient rival test. A general test for exclusionary conduct is needed
only for evaluating mixed bag conduct that creates some efficiencies
but also may enhance market power. ‘‘Naked’’ exclusionary prac-
tices—those that exclude competition without providing any effi-
ciency benefits—can be easily condemned without reference to any
test for exclusionary conduct. Thus, the fact that the equally efficient
rival test would not condemn some instances of naked exclusion is
not troubling.111
The other two criticisms of the equally efficient rival test are more
potent. First, critics have observed that some acts of exclusion can
108See generally Lao, supra note 18, at 446–47; Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 153–54;
Salop, supra note 24, at 328–29; Melamed, supra note 31, at 388–89; Hovenkamp, supra
note 11, at 153–55.
109See, e.g., Lao, supra note 18, at 447 (noting that under the rule ‘‘[a] dominant
firm would be free to use any conduct, including those of no social utility, to exclude
the only competitors that it would likely ever face’’); Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at
154 (arguing that there is value in prohibiting socially useless conduct that could
exclude less efficient rivals even if it could not exclude an equally efficient rival).
110Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 154.
111Cf. Melamed, supra note 31, at 399 (observing that ‘‘conduct [that] has no effi-
ciency properties and serves only to harm rivals . . . can be readily condemnedwithout
application of either a balancing test or a sacrifice test,’’ for such conduct ‘‘does not
raise the issue at which these tests are directed: what to do about conduct that both
has efficiency benefits and excludes rivals’’).
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prevent rivals from attaining equivalent efficiencies.112 For example,
conduct that forecloses marketing opportunities and thus impedes
a rival’s growth may prevent that rival from achieving minimum
efficient scale so that it never becomes as efficient as the perpetra-
tor.113 The equally efficient rival test under-deters in that it would
sanction this sort of efficiency-precluding conduct. In addition, crit-
ics of the test assert, there is significant social value in protecting
even those rivals who are not as efficient as the perpetrator if they
are the only ones likely to arrive on the scene.114 For example, suppose
a dominant firm had costs of $10 per unit but charged a profit-
maximizing price of $20. The existence or potential entry of a rival
with costs of, say, $13 could be beneficial for consumers. If that rival
were to charge $15 per unit, the dominant firm would be forced to
reduce its price or improve its quality.115 Thus, consumer welfare
may be harmed by an exclusionary conduct test that protects only
equally or more efficient rivals.
B. The Other Approaches’ Over-Deterrence
While the equally efficient rival test may fail to condemn some
instances of anti-competitive unilateral conduct, the competing tests
for exclusionary conduct are likely to over-deter if applied ex post
in the context of litigation. Each of the competing tests requires a
112See, e.g., Lao, supra note 18, at 447 (‘‘[E]xclusionary practices are often designed
specifically to prevent a challenger from gaining scale efficiencies.’’); Melamed, supra
note 31, at 388 (‘‘[A] rival that is less efficient today might become equally or more
efficient if permitted time to develop learning-by-doing economies or if its sales grew
and enabled it to gain scale economies.’’).
113See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, The Exclusion of Competition for Hospital Sales Through
GroupPurchasingOrganizations 24 n.68, 33–34 (2002) (report toU.S. Senate), available
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo report june 02.pdf
(arguing that it is not sufficient to ask whether a bundled discount could exclude an
equally efficient competitor, for such discounts may be used to prevent rivals from
growing and thereby attaining scale efficiencies).
114Lao, supra note 18, at 447 (‘‘The existence, or even the potential entry, of a less
efficient rival can, in fact, constrain a monopolist, thereby benefiting consumers, and
its exclusion would harm consumer welfare.’’); Salop, supra note 24, at 328–29 (noting
that ‘‘unencumbered (potential) entry of less-efficient competitors often raises con-
sumer welfare’’); Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 154 (noting that equally efficient rival
test ‘‘can underdeter in situations where the rival that is most likely to emerge is
less efficient than the dominant firm’’).
115Lao, supra note 18, at 447; see also Salop, supra note 24, at 328–29 (offering
similar example).
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detailed factual inquiry that would likely have to be resolved at trial
by a finder of fact—usually a jury. That is troubling, because antitrust
issues are notoriously difficult for juries to comprehend,116 and the
risk of an arbitrary damages award—automatically trebled117—is
quite significant. Business firms, recognizing this risk, may forego
conduct that is pro-competitive on the whole but might not be recog-
nized as such by a bunch of overwhelmed jurors.118
First consider the consumer welfare effect test set forth in the
Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise.119 That test deems conduct exclusion-
ary if it is ‘‘reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging
monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals’’ and either
does not benefit consumers at all or is not necessary for the claimed
consumer benefits or produces harms disproportionate to the bene-
fits produced.120 Under that test, practically all mixed bag conduct
would have to be evaluated by a jury. A court could grant summary
judgment only if the conduct at issue was not ‘‘reasonably capable
of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing
the opportunities of rivals’’ (in which case the defendant would be
entitled to summary judgment) or if the conduct caused exclusion
116Consider, for example, Professor Arthur Austin’s account of his post-trial inter-
views of theBrookeGroup jurors. Austin concluded that ‘‘the jurorswere overwhelmed,
frustrated, and confused by testimony well beyond their comprehension’’ and that
‘‘at no time did any juror grasp—even at the margins—the law, the economics or
any other testimony relating to the allegations or defense.’’ Arthur Austin, The Jury
System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev.
51 (1995).
117See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (providing for automatic trebling of damages in most civil
antitrust suits).
118Professor Elhauge, for example, observes that
firms must operate under the risk that the actual criteria by which their
conduct will be judged will depend largely on the happenstance of which
judge and jurors will be selected in a trial a great number of years later that
will retroactively decide whether to assess multimillion or even multibillion
dollar treble damages. Further, firms run the risk that different judges or
juries will reach inconsistent conclusions about the legality of their conduct
based on different implicit normative criteria. These sorts of risks cannot
help but chill investments to create product offerings with a sufficient quality
or cost advantage over preexisting market options. . . .
Elhauge, supra note 15, at 266–67.
1193 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 30, ¶ 651a at 72 (discussed supra in notes
30–34 and accompanying text).
120See Id.
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but created no consumer benefit (in which case the plaintiff would
be entitled to summary judgment on the exclusionary conduct ele-
ment). All other cases would raise fact issues regarding the necessity
of the conduct for the claimed consumer benefit and the degree to
which the benefits of the conduct exceeded the costs thereof.121 Given
the prospects of an adverse verdict awarding treble damages, firms
would do well to avoid any conduct—even efficiency-enhancing
conduct—that could impair rivals’ opportunities and thereby create,
enlarge, or prolong monopoly or monopsony power.
On first glance, the sacrifice-based tests would seem to avoid this
problem, for they call for a much more focused inquiry and create
an apparent safe harbor for conduct that would enhance profits
apart from an increase in market power. In actual practice, however,
the sacrifice-based tests are likely to be similarly indeterminate and
thus susceptible to arbitrary jury verdicts and the over-deterrence
they generate. To apply the profit sacrifice or no economic sense
test, a courtwould compare the defendant’s expected profits without
the allegedly exclusionary practice to what its profits would have
been with the practice if there were no price-raising (or input cost-
lowering) resulting from enhanced monopoly (or monopsony)
power.122 This gets quite complicated when the conduct at issue is
likely to result in some efficiency enhancements and some increase
in market power.123 Because the key question is whether the conduct
would be profitable but for the enhancement of market power, the
fact-finder must: (1) determine the cost to the defendant of engaging
in the conduct at issue, (2) ascertain the incremental revenue gain
resulting from the conduct at issue, (3) estimate the portion of that
revenue gain attributable to an increase inmarket power, (4) subtract
121 In Weyerhaeuser, for example, plaintiff Ross-Simmons could easily have shown
that defendant Weyerhaeuser’s overbidding was reasonably capable of creating or
enlarging monopsony power, see supra note 89 and accompanying text, so the case
would have had to go to a jury to determine whether the conduct produced harms
disproportionate to any consumer benefits.
122Salop, supra note 24, at 319 (discussing implementation of profit sacrifice test
and its no economic sense variant).
123 Indeed, Gregory Werden, an advocate of the no economic sense version of the
test, admits as much. Werden, supra note 33, at 415–16 (‘‘The application of the test
can be difficult . . . if the defendant benefits from the conduct absent any tendency
to eliminate competition, because the testmay then require an analysis of a competitive
environment quite different from that which currently exists.’’).
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that amount from the total incremental revenue gain, and (5) com-
pare the remaining incremental revenue gain to the cost of engaging
in the conduct at issue. Only if the nonmarket power-induced reve-
nue enhancement exceeds the cost of engaging in the conduct is
such conduct non-exclusionary.124
An approach that asked whether challenged conduct raised rivals’
costs unjustifiably would almost always send challenged conduct to
the jury for an open-ended, unpredictable evaluation. If justifiability
were assessed on a case-by-case basis, jurors would be called on
to conduct a highly indeterminate ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’
inquiry. Even under the more structured approach advocated by
Professor Elhauge, who has acknowledged the need to provide
determinate standards,125 arbitrary jury decisions would be inevita-
ble. Elhauge defines ‘‘justifiable’’ cost-raising as that which occurs
because of an enhancement in the defendant’s efficiency; cost-raising
occurring regardless of an increase in the defendant’s efficiency is
per se unjustifiable.126 On first glance, the fact-finder’s task appears
simple: determinewhether the increase in rivals’ costs is a byproduct
of an enhancement in the defendant’s efficiency.127 In actual practice,
though, that inquiry gets quite messy.
Consider, for example, a challenge to a firm’s 12% loyalty rebate
on purchases over 1,000 units. Suppose that a rival firm claimed
that this structured discount usurped so much business from the
rival that it fell below minimum efficient scale (i.e., its per-unit costs
were raised). The jury, then, would have to determine whether that
cost-raising was justifiable. Suppose that the defendant demon-
strated that it was running its factories at 70% capacity prior to
124 In Weyerhaeuser, for example, the fact-finder would have had to (1) determine
what it cost Weyerhaeuser to overbid, (2) predict how much Weyerhaeuser’s total
revenues were expected to increase because of the overbidding, (3) figure what per-
centage of that expected increasewould be due tomonopsony power, and (4) compare
the remaining expected revenue enhancement to the cost of the overbidding to deter-
mine whether the overbiddingwould have made economic sense but for the enhance-
ment in monopsony power.
125See supra note 118.
126See supra note 27.
127Elhauge, supra note 15, at 256 (arguing that the only tolerable conduct that raises
rivals’ costs is that which ‘‘successfully impair[s] rival efficiency only as a byproduct
of the defendant improving its own efficiency’’).
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offering the discount and that the discount increased sales so that
the factories were run at 90% capacity, creating apparent economies
of scale. If the plaintiff could show (1) that all available efficiencies
could be exploited at 80% capacity because incremental scale econo-
mies above that level of production were offset by diseconomies
occasioned by excessive wear and tear, and (2) that an 8% loyalty
rebate would drive production to 80% capacity, then the ‘‘excessive’’
loyalty discount (the additional four percentage points) would
appear unjustifiable—i.e., it would raise rivals’ costs ‘‘regardless of
any improvement in defendant efficiency.’’128 Of course, it would be
a Herculean task to determine the level of production at which
economies of scale are maximized and the size of any structured
discount necessary to achieve that level. But that is precisely the
task a jury would confront under a raising rivals’ cost test. Arbitrary
verdicts—and the chilling effect they inspire—would inevitably
result.
C. Why the Equally Efficient Rival’s Under-Deterrence Is of Less
Concern than Other Approaches’ Over-Deterrence
We have seen that a liability rule requiring a plaintiff to establish
exclusion of an equally efficient rival is somewhat under-deterrent
but that the other proposed tests for exclusionary conduct are likely
to over-deter. The key question, then, is whether the social loss
resulting from the equally efficient rival test’s under-deterrence is
likely to outweigh that stemming from the other tests’ over-deter-
rence, or vice-versa.While a detailed accounting of thewelfare losses
occasioned by the various tests is beyond the scope of this article,
there are good reasons to suspect that the equally efficient rival test’s
under-deterrence is the better poison.
As noted above, the equally efficient rival test may produce false
negatives for two reasons: it does not condemn practices that prevent
rivals from becoming as efficient as the defendant, and it may permit
exclusion of the only competition a dominant firm is likely to face
if that competition is less efficient than the dominant firm.129 The
128Elhauge, supra note 15, at 330.
129See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. (As noted, it is of no concern
that the equally efficient rival test could approve socially useless conduct that would
exclude less efficient rivals. A generalized test for exclusionary conduct is needed
only when the challenged conduct presents a ‘‘mixed bag’’ of pro-competitive benefits
and anti-competitive harms. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.)
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first concern is not that great, for a broader definition of exclusionary
conduct under Section 2—a definition that would capture conduct
that could prevent rivals from achieving equivalent efficiency—
would not provide much benefit in terms of added deterrence. That
is because most of the means by which a defendant might attempt
to prevent rivals from attaining equivalent efficiency either (1) are
already regulated by another legal provision; (2) would be permit-
ted, regardless of the governing test for exclusionary conduct, by
immunities or safe harbors; or (3) could not succeed against a smaller
rival that is both aggressive and competent.
To see this point, consider the variousmeans bywhich a defendant
could prevent rivals from achieving equivalent efficiencies. Most
obviously, the defendant could engage in practices that would pre-
vent rivals from reaching minimum efficient scale. For example, the
defendant could engage in exclusive dealing or tying, both of which
have the effect of foreclosing rivals from marketing opportunities.130
It could also achieve foreclosure by offering discounts that have the
effect of usurping business from rivals.131 Alternatively, it might
engage in more direct means of foreclosure by, for example, paying
dealers not to carry rivals’ products. If the defendant controlled an
asset that rivals needed to access in order to grow to minimum
efficient scale, it could deny access to that asset.132
In addition to denying rivals scale, a defendant might prevent
rivals from attaining equivalent efficiency by taking steps to drive
up the price of an input. Of course, the defendant would have to
ensure that the price of the input rose for rivals only and not for itself;
otherwise, the strategywould not render rivals relatively inefficient.133
130SeeHovenkamp, supra note 37, at 199–201 (explaining howboth exclusive dealing
and tying, while often procompetitive, can lead to market foreclosure).
131 Id. at 171–74 (explaining how structured discounts such as loyalty or bundled
discounts can lead to market foreclosure); Id. at 161–62 (discussing foreclosure effects
of predatory and limit pricing).
132See generally Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 3A Antitrust Law ¶ 772a,
at 174 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining ‘‘intuitive appeal’’ of essential facilities doctrine,
which may reach either concerted or unilateral refusals to share).
133Thus, Weyerhaeuser-type overbidding, which drives up input prices for all com-
petitors, could not preclude rivals from attaining equivalent efficiencies.
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The defendant would therefore need to convince input-suppliers to
charge a higher price to rivals than to the defendant.134
A third means of preventing equivalent efficiencies could be
exploited by defendants who sell a product that must be used in
conjunction with the competitive product. By redesigning the com-
plementary product so that it would work with the defendant’s
version of the competitive product but not with that of rivals, the
defendant could force rivals to engage in costly product re-design,
thereby reducing their efficiencies relative to the defendant’s.135
Finally, a defendant might render rivals less efficient by convinc-
ing the government to impose some restriction that would raise
rivals’ costs relative to those of the defendant.136 For example, a
defendant might lobby regulators to require all competitors to adopt
design specifications the defendant was already utilizing.
While all of these strategies could plausibly prevent less efficient
rivals from becoming as efficient as a defendant and therefore would
not be condemned as exclusionary under the equally efficient rival
test, that possibility does not provide a compelling reason for reject-
ing the test in Section 2 cases. Expanding Section 2 liability to reach
the aforementioned practices would provide little in the way of
additional deterrence. First, many of the practices are already ade-
quately regulated. Any exclusionary practice involving concerted
conduct—an agreement—is covered by Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.137 Thus, tying, exclusive dealing, concerted refusals to deal,
134This would require some sort of agreement between the defendant and input
suppliers.
135See Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp & Einer Elhauge, 10 Antitrust Law
¶ 1757a, at 317 (2d ed. 2004) (recognizing that ‘‘if a defendant has market power in
a primary product that works better with his complementary product than with
rival versions, this technological interdependence may have the ‘practical effect’ of
foreclosing rivals in the complementary market’’ and proposing liability in very
limited circumstances that would include, inter alia, redesign to create
incompatibility).
136Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 1 Antitrust Law ¶ 201, at 145 (2d ed.
2002) (‘‘Collaborators or a single firm might use the machinery of government to
obtain, maintain, or strengthen market power. Such a use could thus restrain trade
or be an exclusionary practice if the behavior is improper, unlawful, not privileged,
appropriate for inquiry by the antitrust court (or agency), and significant in result.’’).
13715 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting every ‘‘contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy’’ that
unreasonably restrains trade).
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agreements with dealers not to carry a rival’s products, and agree-
ments with the other owners or controllers of a jointly owned/
controlled essential facility—behaviors that could reduce a rival’s
scale and render it relatively less efficient—are all regulated subject
to well-established liability tests implementing Section 1’s prohibi-
tion of unreasonable restraints of trade. The same would be true for
any agreement with input suppliers that caused them to charge a
higher price to rivals.
Of the remaining practices that might reduce rivals’ efficiencies,
many would be permissible—even if they were deemed ‘‘exclusion-
ary’’ under the governing test—by immunities or safe harbors. Most
exclusionary practices involving the procurement of government
regulations, for example, would be permitted by the Noerr-Penning-
ton doctrine, which removes most governmental petitioning from
antitrust scrutiny.138 Re-design of a complementary product would
likely be protected under safe harbors that have been proposed as
part of the other tests for exclusionary conduct.139 And the Supreme
Court has recently hinted that there can be no antitrust liability
based ondenial of access to an essential facility controlled exclusively
by the defendant.140
The remaining practices on the laundry list of acts that could
prevent rivals from attaining efficiencies involve discounting. While
below-cost discounting and some above-cost ‘‘bundled’’ discounting
would run afoul of the equally efficient rival test,141 even some above-
cost, single product discounting may prevent rivals from attaining
138See generally 1 Areeda&Hovenkamp, supra note 136, at ¶¶ 200–12 (summarizing
Noerr-Pennington petitioning immunity and its ‘‘sham’’ exception).
139See, e.g., Werden, supra note 33, at 419 (proposing that no economic sense test
include a safe harbor for new product introduction, improved product quality, and
cost-reducing innovations because ‘‘the tools of antitrust are too blunt to make it
worthwhile to attempt to the identification of rare exceptions’’ to the general rule
that such conduct benefits consumers); 3 Areeda &Hovenkamp, supra note 30, ¶ 651b,
(proposing that consumer welfare effect test include a safe harbor for ‘‘improved
product quality, energetic market penetration, successful research and development,
cost-reducing innovations, and the like’’).
140See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 410–11 & n.3 (2004) (declining to recognize or repudiate an ‘‘essential
facilities’’ doctrine in case involving unilateral denial of access and taking pains to
distinguish cases imposing liability for concerted denial of access).
141To compete with a defendant’s below-cost price, a rival with equivalent efficienc-
ies would have to price below its own costs. If it lacked the financial reserves to
weather such a money-losing strategy, it could be driven out of business.With respect
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equivalent efficiencies. For example, commentators have argued that
so-called ‘‘limit pricing’’ (discounting from the profit-maximizing
price level to a level that is below competitors’ costs but still above
one’s own costs) and above-cost ‘‘loyalty discounts’’ (discounts or
rebates that are conditioned upon meeting a certain purchase target)
may be used to prevent rivals from growing to minimum efficient
scale and thereby attaining equivalent efficiencies.142 It seems,
though, that an aggressive and competent rival confronting these
sorts of practices would not be prevented from attaining equivalent
efficiencies. If the disadvantaged rival’s product was as good as the
discounter’s and could be produced as cheaply at minimum efficient
scale, the rival should be able to raise enough capital to fund any
discount necessary to grow its market share to the point necessary
to achieve minimum efficient scale.143 Its below-cost pricing for the
period required to achieve such a scale would not amount to preda-
tion because there would be no likelihood of recoupment via supra-
competitive pricing.144
It seems, then, that most of the practices that would prevent rivals
from achievingminimum efficient scale are either regulated by other
to ‘‘bundled’’ discounts (i.e., discounts conditioned upon purchasing products from
multiple product markets), even some discounts that are above-cost—in that the
discounted price exceeds the aggregate cost of the products in the bundle—may
exclude equally efficient competitors that do not produce as broad a line of products.
See Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1688,
1695–97 (2005).(explaining how bundled discount could exclude equally efficient,
but less diversified, rival).
142Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 162 (limit pricing); Tom et al., supra note 26, at
627–29 (loyalty discounts).
143See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 421b, at 67 (2d
ed. 2002) (‘‘If capital markets are working well, new investment will be made in
any market earning anything above competitive returns—a term defined to include
sufficient profit to attract new capital—regardless of the absolute cost of entry.’’);
George J. Stigler, TheOrganization of Industry 67–69 (1968); HaroldDemsetz, Barriers
to Entry, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 47, 49–53 (1982); Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure,
Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J. L. & Econ. 1, 4 (1973). But see Richard R.
Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 949, 950 (1979) (‘‘The
Chicago proposition that scale economies don’t serve as a barrier to entry hinges on
explicit or implicit assumptions about perfect capital markets and no adjustment lags
or costs.’’).
144See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
222–24 (1993) (positing the likelihood of recoupment via future monopoly pricing
as prerequisite to a valid predation claim).
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prohibitions besides Section 2, or subject to immunities or safe har-
bors that would prevent condemnation under Section 2, or unlikely
to succeed against aggressive and competent rivals. Accordingly,
the first source of the equally efficient rival test’s under-deterrence
is of little concern.
That leaves the second source of under-deterrence and raises the
following question: In order to preserve rivals that are less efficient
than the dominant firm but may constrain its exercise of market
power, does it make sense to adopt a broader definition of exclusion-
ary conduct under Section 2? Probably not. Monopoly profits pro-
vide a powerful incentive to enter monopolized markets, and it is
quite difficult formonopolists to continually fight off new entrants.145
For that reason, there are very few ‘‘real’’ monopolies—i.e., markets
in which a single seller faces nomeaningful competition. By contrast,
mixed bag business practices that are pro-competitive on the whole
are ubiquitous and are conceived of all the time. A broader, harder
to apply test for exclusionary conduct would stymie those efficiency-
enhancing practices, and since they are far more common than
uncheckedmonopolies, it ismore important to avoid thwarting them
than to insure against the uncommon and unstable case of unchecked
monopoly.146
In addition, a somewhat under-deterrent definition for exclusion-
ary conduct is appropriate because significant over-deterrence is
already built into Section 2. Successful antitrust plaintiffs are gener-
ally entitled to treble damages.147 This damages multiplier, designed
to account for the chance that a violation may go undetected or may
145Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1984).
146As Judge Easterbrook has explained, the harms related to false positives and
false negatives are incommensurate:
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be
lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions
in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs by
permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over
time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.
True, this long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society in the
interim. The central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the
long run. But this should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate
baleful practices are self-correcting while erroneous condemnations are not.
Id. at 2–3.
14715 U.S.C. § 15.
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not be successfully prosecuted, makes sense for clandestine practices
that are unquestionably bad, such as price-fixing conspiracies. Tre-
bling seems inappropriate, though, when the challenged conduct is
a mixed bag practice that is conducted out in the open.148 Awarding
treble damages to plaintiffs who successfully challenge such conduct
will invite lawsuits of little merit (it’s easy to bring the lawsuit, and
the payoff could be huge) andwill thus tend to deter candid business
practices that are pro-competitive on the whole but difficult to char-
acterize and might, if challenged, be deemed to violate some provi-
sion of the antitrust laws.149 The practices to be evaluated under a
generalized definition of exclusionary conduct are precisely the sorts
of practices for which trebling is overly deterrent: they are mixed
bag practices and they are conducted unilaterally (so they do not
involve secret collusion). For that reason, a somewhat under-deter-
rent liability standard may function as a salutary corrective.
D. Some Examples: Loyalty and Bundled Discounts
Brief consideration of two business practices that have recently
been challenged as exclusionary demonstrates the superiority of the
equally efficient rival test in Section 2 cases. Both loyalty discounts
and bundled discounts150 offer some pro-competitive benefits (most
obviously, consumer-friendly price competition) but may tend to
exclude rivals from the discounter’s market.151 They are precisely
the sort of mixed bag, unilateral practice for which a general exclu-
sionary conduct test is useful. It is thus helpful to compare how
challenges to the practices would proceed under the various
approaches.
Under each of the rejected approaches, challenges to either practice
would almost automatically require jury consideration. Under sacri-
fice-based tests, the jury would have to determine whether some
148See Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 66–68; Posner, supra note 19, at 271–73.
149Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 67.
150Loyalty discounts are discounts or rebates on all purchases of some product once
the purchaser meets a certain purchase target, such as x percent of its requirements.
Bundled discounts are discounts or rebates conditioned on purchasingmultiple goods
from different product markets. See Lambert, supra note 144, at 1693–95, 1706–08
(describing bundled and loyalty, or ‘‘single-product purchase target,’’ discounts).
151 Id. at 1706–07 (explaining how loyalty rebates could exclude); Id. at 1695–97
(explaining how bundled discounts could exclude).
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increment of the discount or rebate made no economic sense but for
its ability to exclude rivals. (For example, if the discount were 10%,
would the discounter, absent an exercise of market power, have
been better off offering a 7% discount? If so, the incremental three
percentage points of discount would make no economic sense but
for the market power it created and would thus be exclusionary.)
The consumer welfare effect test would require the jury to balance
the consumer benefits of the discount against the consumer harms
that could result if the discount impaired rivals and enhanced the
discounter’s market power. Raising rivals’ costs approaches would
require the jury to determine whether any impairment of rivals’
efficiencies resulting from reduced scale was justified. Under Profes-
sor Elhauge’s test for justifiability, the jury would have to determine
whether the discountwas greater than necessary to achievewhatever
productive or distributional efficiencies it created; if so, the excess
discount would raise rivals costs ‘‘regardless of any improvement
in defendant efficiency’’ and would thus be unreasonably exclusion-
ary.152 Given the near inevitability that a challenge to loyalty or
bundled discounting would result in jury consideration and a poten-
tial adverse treble damages verdict under these three approaches, the
approaches would likely deter many consumer-friendly discounts.
Indeed, two decisions that gave juries great leeway to evaluate the
legality of structured discounts—the district court decision in Con-
cord Boat153 and the en banc Third Circuit decision in LePage’s154—
created significant concern for firms contemplating such discounts.155
By contrast, if loyalty or bundled discounts were evaluated under
the equally efficient rival test, firms considering such discount pro-
grams could rely on genuine safe harbors. With respect to loyalty
152Elhauge, supra note 15, at 330.
153Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 923, 929–30 (E.D. Ark.
1998) (denying defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law in case involving
above-cost loyalty discounts), rev’d 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).
154LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (upholding jury verdict
imposing Section 2 liability based on above-cost bundled discounts), cert. denied,
542 U.S. 953 (2004).
155Cf. Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations 94
(2007), available at http://www.amc.gov/report recommendation/amc final
report.pdf (‘‘[T]he Third Circuit’s [LePage’s] decision is likely to discourage firms
from offering procompetitive bundled discounts and rebates to consumers.’’).
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discounts, firms would not need to worry about any discount that
resulted in a discounted price that was still above the discounter’s
cost; any such discount could bemet by, and thuswould not exclude,
an equally efficient rival.156 Bundleddiscounts are a different compet-
itive animal, for they may drive equally efficient rivals from the
market even if they result in an above-cost price for the collection
of items in the bundle.157 Still, if such discounts were evaluated under
the equally efficient rival test for exclusionary conduct, genuine safe
harbors would exist. I have elsewhere detailed one safe harbor—
i.e., a set of circumstances in which no equally efficient rival would
be excluded by a bundled discount.158 In addition, the Ortho court,
implicitly relying on the equally efficient rival approach to identify-
ing exclusionary conduct, created a safe harbor for bundled dis-
counts by requiring that plaintiffs challenging such discounts prove
either that the discounts resulted in a below-cost price for the bundle
or that they were as efficient as the discounter but were not able to
compete because of the discount.159 Under that rule, a firm that knew
it was the most efficient competitor could offer bundled discounts
without fear of liability. Thus, the equally efficient rival test creates
clear safe harbors. In light of the realities of antitrust litigation and
the limited abilities of juries to resolve complicated economic ques-
tions, the test is therefore less likely than the rejected approaches to
deter above-cost loyalty and bundled discounts, as well as other
mixed bag practices that are pro-competitive on the whole but that
might be deemed exclusionary by perplexed jurors.
V. Conclusion
Just last year, Professor Steven Salop curtly dismissed ‘‘the Brooke
Group standard,’’ which ultimately focuses on whether the conduct
at issue could exclude an equally efficient rival, by observing that
156 In reversing the district court and holding that the Concord Boat defendant’s
conduct could not give rise to antitrust liability absent proof that the discount resulted
in below-cost pricing, the Eighth Circuit created this sort of safe harbor for above-
cost loyalty discounts. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039,
1061–63 (8th Cir. 2000).
157See Lambert, supra note 141, at 1695–96.
158See id. at 1742–53.
159Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (setting forth test for evaluating legality of bundled discount).
A : 97901$$CH4
08-30-07 10:04:13 Page 312Layout: 97901 : Even
312
Weyerhaeuser and the Search for Antitrust’s Holy Grail
it ‘‘is not generally proposed as the liability standard for exclusionary
conduct other than predatory pricing.’’160 After Weyerhaeuser, the
equally efficient rival standard cannot be so limited. Indeed, the
other proposed definitions of exclusionary conduct would have
mandated a different outcome in Weyerhaeuser, and the Supreme
Court thus appears to have implicitly rejected those standards in
favor of the equally efficient rival standard.
In doing so, the Court adhered to Voltaire’s prudent maxim, ‘‘The
perfect is the enemy of the good.’’161 The equally efficient rival stan-
dard, while good, is admittedly imperfect: it is under-deterrent. On
the other hand, its more ‘‘perfect’’ competitors—those that would
more exhaustively condemn practices that could be anti-competitive
in the long run—would entail administrative difficulties that would
almost certainly result in the over-deterrence of practices that are,
on the whole, pro-competitive. Because the welfare loss from such
over-deterrence would likely outweigh that occasioned by the
equally efficient rival test’s under-deterrence, theWeyerhaeuserCourt
was wise to forego the perfect in favor of the good.
160Salop, supra note 24, at 318.
161Le mieux est ennemi du bien, Voltaire, La Begueule, 3 Recueil des Meilleurs
Contes en vers 77, 77 (1778).
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